

















































This article reviews Latin America–Spain relations from 1982 to 2014, with a focus on the financial crisis (2008–2014). The theoretical framework for the study follows rule-oriented constructivism, which regards social activity as a process of interaction among actors mediated by rules. The focus thus falls on rules, rulemaking, and the actors (norm entrepreneurs) who exercise their “normative power” (material or symbolic) to shape these rules. The empirical section of the article analyzes the creation of a “normative Iberoamerican community” constituted by Latin America (the article focuses on Brazil and Mexico) and Spain in the 1980s–1990s and takes the promotion of foreign direct investments as a case study. The article highlights the role of governments and multinational enterprises as “norm entrepreneurs” in the promotion of foreign direct investment within the Iberoamerican community. The Brazilian and Mexican governments hoped to attract Spanish foreign direct investment to gain technology and knowhow and offered Spanish multinational enterprises growing markets. The Spanish government hoped to attract Latin American foreign direct investment during the financial crisis and offered Latin American multinational enterprises a foothold in the European Union. The article concludes that the financial crisis strengthened the Iberoamerican normative community.















The adopotion of pro-market reforms across Latin America and Spain since the 1980s triggered a wave of foreign direct investment (FDI) that continues to this day. Spanish firms began to make large FDI in Latin America in the late 1980s, when they took part in the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises (Durán Herrera, 1996, 1997, 1999; Casilda Béjar, 2002.) FDI by Latin American multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Spain grew significantly during the financial crisis that affected Spain beginning in 2008 (Royo, 2015). This article explores the role of FDI in Latin America–Spain relations.
There is abundant literature on the relationship between FDI and politics within the discipline of International Political Economy. Three important schools stand out. Structuralist studies such as those of I. Wallerstein and A. G. Frank apply the concept of the international division of labor to international relations and conclude that international economic relations are exploitative in nature. Some regions (the core) develop through the extraction of surplus value from the others (semiperiphery or periphery). MNEs play a very important role by channelling surplus value from the periphery to the core (Frank, 1975; Wallerstein, 1979).
Liberal scholars such as R. Keohane and J. Nye argue that, in a world of “complex interdependence,” the channels that connect societies have grown and limit the power of the state in international relations. Taking a Kantian approach, they argue that the more intense the economic relations among countries, the lower the likelihood of an armed conflict, because the growth of economic relations “spills over” into other fields such as political, defense, or cultural cooperation. MNEs facilitate peaceful relations between states by benefiting home and host countries (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Realist scholars such as R. Gilpin claim that economic relations such as FDIs are dependent on political relations without which investment would never happen (Gilpin, 1975, pp. 4–8).

Methodology
This article argues that a broader normative framework that regarded FDI as a priority made FDI between Latin America and Spain easier. The normative approach understands relations betwen Latin America and Spain as a function of the principles and norms accepted by the actors. The adoption of liberal principles since the 1980s facilitated agreement on specific rules of interaction. The parties negotiated these rules, which  served as the basis for the intensification of relations on several fronts. To develop this argument, the article follows a rule-oriented constructivist approach as developed by N. Onuf (1989, 2012). Rule-oriented constructivism reacts against the methodological causality borrowed from the natural sciences, through approaches such as realism and liberalism. Both conceive of an atomistic universe of self-regarding units whose identity is assumed given and fixed and who largely respond to material interests that are stipulated by assumption. E. Durkheim (1982) challenged the adequacy of this approach and tried to incorporate ideational factors into the analysis of social reality. He argued that social facts are made up of a combination of individual facts via social interactions. The relevance of social interaction resides not in the original elements but in the totality formed by the union. Some of these “social facts” are linguistic practices, religious beliefs, moral norms, and similar ideational factors, all of which influence social behavior (Ruggie, 1998, p. 29).
Rule-oriented constructivism is an approach of normative inquiry. One of its basic arguments is that people and society co-constitute one another. Social relations construct people into the kind of beings that we are, and people make the world what it is (Onuf, 1989, p. 36). People and society are linked by rules, which are statements that tell people what they should do and what to expect (Onuf, 1998, p. 59). Rules bring about practices, which also tell us who the participants in society are (the agents). Actors are agents only to the extent that society—through its rules—makes it possible for them to participate in the process. Rules and practices form a stable pattern suiting the agents’ intentions, called institutions.
Rule-oriented constructivism derives rules from speech acts, of which Onuf identifies three types. Assertive speech acts are assertions about a belief, a state of affairs. They are coupled with the speaker’s intention that the hearer accepts this belief. Directive speech acts are demands. They present the hearer with a speaker’s intention as to some act the speaker would like to have performed. Commissive speech acts are promises. They reveal the speaker’s intention of being committed to a stated course of action (Onuf, 1989, p. 88). Speech acts turn into conventions when everyone believes that the words themselves, and not the speakers, are responsible for what happens.
Conventions remind agents what they have always done and become normative themselves when they tell agents what to do. The convention thus gains strength as a rule when agents accept the “should” component. The three types of speech acts generate three types of rules. Instruction-rules are principles. They inform agents about the world and tell them what consequences will follow if they disregard those rules. Directive-rules are imperative. They tell agents what they must do and often provide information about the consequences for disregarding them, thereby making it possible for agents to choose whether to follow them. Commitment-rules are the promises of actors. They are “contracts” and become generalized and normative in their own terms, which agents recognize in their effects as rights and duties (Onuf, 1989, p. 88).
Onuf explains that rule-oriented constructivism rejects a definition of society based on the Hobbesian separation between authority and anarchy, and proposes the herrschaft paradigm, introduced in the German tradition of social thought, from Hegel and Weber. This tradition rests on relations of super- and subordination, maintained through rules and practices and obtaining in rule (Onuf, 1989, p. 196). Rules and practices enable an association for the common good to achieve its purpose. These are the “conditions of rule” or politeia. Conditions of rule constitute an operative paradigm, defined as an ensemble of human practices that those engaging in or observing them see as having coherence, which sets them apart from other practices (Onuf, 1998, p. 7).
This definition of paradigm comes from S. Wolin (1980), who claimed that operative paradigms that are seen as coherent in the highest degree are taken as having a natural objective reality. International relations are constituted on the belief that they correspond to an operative paradigm. Three paradigms exist in the social sciences today. The first one is liberalism, which results from the application of microeconomic principles, mainly rational choice, in an anarchic market. The second one is Marxism, focused on relations of production. The third one is political society, as proposed by Wolin, who argues that the concept of authority binds together the ensemble of practices constituting a paradigm (Wolin, 1980, pp. 182-184).
The concept of political society should include rules and rule. Rules are the backbone of society, because they guide (but do not determine) social conduct, thereby giving it social meaning. Rule, or politics, emerges when rules have the effect of distributing advantages unequally. Fundamental change occurs when actors through their practices change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction. Reproduction of the practice of international actors depends on the reproduction of practices of domestic actors (individuals and groups). Therefore, fundamental changes in international politics occur when beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered, altering the rules and norms that are constitutive of their political practices, too (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994, p. 216). Old rules get challenged and new rules get adopted when some actors, “norm entrepreneurs,” use their power to challenge old rules and propose new ones. Norm entrepreneurs challenge previous conventions and are capable of promoting domestic and international normative change through the diffusion of their ideas and norms. Their power to be norm entrepreneurs rises from their ability to have the members of their normative community validate their new normative claims as legitimate (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).
This article argues that there is an “Iberoamerican normative community.” Relations among Latin American societies and Spain are mediated by a set of rules that guide the interaction among them. The idea of normative communities refers to a set of patterned interactions. It is the “constitutional structure” that allows multiple collective representations of community, within or beyond the state. The relevant actors (norm entrepreneurs) create these structures, which determine the legitimate participants and the legitimate actions (Santa-Cruz, 2005, pp. 667–668). 
The time period of study is 1982–2014. To understand the creation of the Iberoamerican normative community, this article analyzes how the rules of interaction have emerged since 1982, when Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González (1982–1996) came to power. The emphasis is on instruction rules or the principles that inform relations within the community. They are based on liberal principles such as freedom of investment, most-favored status, and legal guarantees against political risk. The article takes the rules promoting FDI as a case study. Promotion of FDI became an important component of the Iberoamerican normative community at the request of Felipe González, who regarded economic cooperation as a tool for development. FDI has been an important component of the Iberoamerican normative community since then. A strong focus of the article is on the role of the Iberoamerican normative community during the financial crisis that erupted in Latin America and Spain in 2008 and ended in 2014, when Spain resumed economic growth.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The third section discusses the Iberoamerican community created after the third wave of democratization that has swept through Latin America since the 1980s, highlighting the rules on which this community was based. The fourth section reviews the role of Spanish MNEs and the Spanish government as norm entrepreneurs in the late 1980s and 1990s, as they justified the significant FDIs of Spanish MNEs in Latin America. The fifth section focuses on the financial crisis that erupted in 2007 and reviews the role of the governments and MNEs from Latin America and Spain as they tried to promote FDI within the Iberoamerican community. The focus is on Brazil, Mexico, and Spain, the three largest economies and the three largest homes of and hosts to FDI in the Iberoamerican community.

The Iberoamerican Community
The instruction rules that informed the Iberoamerican normative community after the third wave of democratization that began in the 1970s were based on a liberal conception of politics that prioritized the protection of individual liberaties. The promotion of democracy and human rights became priorities in inter-American relations in the 1980s. In 1991, the Santiago Commitment and its associate resolutions on democracy mandated an immediate meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) Permanent Council following the rupture of democratic rule in any country in the Americas and the adoption of measures to return a country to democratic rule. The Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted in 2001 granted the OAS powers to intervene upon request in cases of democratic crisis. The Rio Group also followed a similar line of action (Wiarda & Kline, 2014, p. 63). 
The OAS responded quickly to democratic crises in the Americas. It did not recognize the dictatorship of Raoul Cedras in Haiti, who deposed the first democratically elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, and condemned Alberto Fujimori’s desicison to dissolve Peru’s congress and suspend basic civil rights in 1992 (Santa-Cruz, 2005, p. 685). In 1994, the OAS forced President Joaquín Balaguer of the Dominican Republic to negotiate with the opposition to prevent international delegitimization after the controversial elections. The Mexican government accepted international observers for the first time in 1994 (Van Kleveren, 2001, pp. 127–128). The OAS stated its satisfaction with the “reinstatement of the constitutional order” in Venezuela in 2002, following the coup attempt against Hugo Chávez (OAS, 2002). The OAS suspended Honduras in 2009 when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted (Ruhl, 2014, pp. 421–422) and raised concerns about the process of impeachment of Paraguay’s President Fernando Lugo in 2012, advocating new elections (OAS, 2012).
Relations between Latin America and Spain since the late 1970s have been based on instruction rules such as promotion of democracy, human rights, cooperation for development, security, and multilateralism embodied in the “Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones,” created in 1992 to subsitute the previous “Comunidad Hispánica de Naciones” (Del Arenal, 1994, pp. 110–113, 116–117, 136). Despite these types of relations, promotion of FDI has not been a critical instruction rule since the 1970s. It was part of the broader principles of development and economic cooperation. The inclusion of development programs in Spain–Latin America relations came first from the administration of Spain’s Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez. In 1976, Spain joined the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and created a development fund called Fondo de Ayuda al Desarrollo (FAD). In 1977, Spain established the Comisión Interministerial para la Ayuda al Desarrollo (Del Arenal, 1994, p. 188). The impetus for the promotion of FDI came from the administration of Felipe González (1982–1996), under whose presidency Spain stressed the principle of economic development and sped up political, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation with Latin America (Del Arenal, 1994, p. 133; Grugel, 1997, pp. 141–149). 
In 1985, the Spanish government created the Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica (SECIPI) to coordinate Spain’s development aid programs. In 1986, the government created the Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (AECI) as an autonomous institution within SECIPI to focus exclusively on development aid (Del Arenal, 1994, pp. 190–191). Since 1988, Spain also began to sign “bilateral treaties for cooperation and friendship” with each country in Latin America (Del Arenal, 1994, p. 193). By 1993, 45% of Spain’s development aid went to Latin America (García-Calvo Rosell, 2003).
Spanish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were very active in the development of cooperation programs. In the 1980s, they created “Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo.” Of these coordination programs, 75% percent were active in Latin America. Universities, institutes, and research centers began to cooperate more closely with their Latin American counterparts. The Consejo Español de Estudios Iberoamericanos played an important role in promoting academic and intellectual cooperation between Spanish and Latin American institutions, as did the Casa de América after its creation in 1992 (Del Arenal, 1994, p. 153).
Another important instruction-rule that guided Spain’s relations with Latin America was multilateralism. The Spanish government believed that cooperating with like-minded states through international organizations to promote democracy, human rights, and economic development could legitimize Spain’s international standing as a democratic society. That is why Spanish authorities tried to integrate Spain into Latin American multilateral institutions such as the IDB and OAS, and pushed actively for the celebration of annual Iberoamerican summits beginning in 1992, which brought together the leaders of Portugal, Spain, Latin America, and the Caribbean, to strengthen ties and to develop cooperation programs (Grugel, 1997, pp. 137–138). Moreover, the Spanish government pushed the European Union to pursue a Latin American foreign policy along the same lines as Spain’s (Del Arenal, 1994, pp. 204–205).

Creation of an Iberoamerican Investment Community: FDI Promotion since the 1980s
In the late 1980s, the administration of Felipe González regarded the internationalization of Spanish firms through FDI as a critical component of a broader strategy to modernize the Spanish economy and strengthen the role of non-state actors in Spain’s international relations (Durán Herrera, 1999). At the same time, governments across Latin America were implementing structural reforms that included trade liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises in response to the financial crises of the 1980s. The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were created in the 1990s, and other regional blocs in the Americas such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Andean Community, and Caricom were revitalized (Edwards, 1995). 
In this context, the prime ministers of Spain became key norm entrepreneurs. They made FDI promotion a key instruction-rule of Spain’s Latin America policy. This rule was part of a broader set of instruction-rules based on liberal economic philosophy, along with competition legislation, fiscal policy, macroeconomic stability, and debt servicing. These rules sought to create favorable conditions for international investment across Iberoamerica. A wave of investments by Spanish firms in Latin America followed in the late 1980s. 
Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar (1996–2004) also exercised a critical role as norm entrepreneur and promoted FDI across Iberoamerica. Between June 25 and July 4, 1999 he visited Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela had undergone political unrest in the preceding months. Trinidad and Tobago was host to one Spanish MNE, Repsol–YPF, which participated in a major project to produce oil and natural gas. He also went to Rio do Janeiro, Brazil, to attend the European Union–Latin America summit. He used these visits to encourage his hosts to adopt the liberal instruction-rules discussed above (Aznar, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d).
 On October 8, 2000, Aznar hosted Mexico’s president, Vicente Fox, in Madrid. The FDI of Spanish MNEs in Mexico was an important part of the bilateral summit. Fox made legitimate Aznar’s claims about the importance of promoting FDI within the Iberoamerican community, promised laws (directive-rules) to spell out the terms of protection for FDI, and announced further privatizations, encouraging Spanish firms to submit bids (Aznárez, 2000). On July 10, 2001, Aznar met with Ecuador’s President Gustavo Noboa in Madrid to discuss the status of Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain and to refinance Ecuador’s debt with Spain. He took this opportunity to make normative claims, calling for a firm commitment from Ecuador to liberal economic instruction-rules such as structural reforms, liberalization, and privatization of state-owned firms. He also called for the adoption of directive-rules such as competition legislation to attract more Spanish investment. Aznar also emphasized other instruction-rules such as good governance, transparency and economic and political stability for Spanish FDI. President Noboa also validated his claims as legitimate (Aznar, 2001).
The United States, which saw itself as the closest partner of Latin America, was a potential challenger to the emergence of the new liberal Iberoamerican normative community, but the similarity of the instruction-rules within the Iberoamerican community to those informing U.S. Latin America policy led the United States to accept Spain as a legitimate norm entrepreneur and as a significant player in Latin America in the late 1980s and validated Spain’s normative moves as legitimate. After Spain consolidated its democractic reforms and reasserted itself as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. President George Bush said in 1988 and 1991 that Spain played a “very special role” in Latin America (Del Arenal, 1994, p. 132).

The Iberoamerican Investment Community during the Financial Crisis, 2008–2013









L.A. exports to Spain	L.A. imports from Spain	L.A. share of Spanish exports, 2007	L.A. share of Spanish exports, 2013	L.A. share of Spanish exports increase 2007-2013
+73%	+59%	4.8%	6.5%	+35%
				








Source: Spanish Ministry of the Economy.	

The biggest economic effect of the crisis on Spain–Latin America relations from a macroeconomic perspective was the significant increase of FDI by Latin American MNEs in Spain (see table 2). Between 2007 and 2011, Latin American MNEs invested €307 million in Spain annually. The annual average for 2012 and 2013 jumped 4.6 times, to €1.4 billion. The share of Spanish FDI going to Latin America also grew considerably, from 8.1% in 2007 to 23% for the period 2011–13 (Spain Ministry of the Economy, 2014). Mexican MNEs were at the forefront of this expansion via FDIs in Spain. ADO, Bimbo, BX+, Carso, Cemex, Davinci Capital, Fibra Uno, Inmosan, Pemex, Sigma, Televisa, and Fintech (David Martínez’s U.S. financial arm) invested in Spain’s banking, oil, transport, real estate, and food industries. In 2014, Mexico was the sixth-largest source of incoming FDI in Spain and the largest outside of the Europen Union. Mexico alone accounted for half of incoming FDI generated in Latin America. Mexico was also the second host to Spanish FDI in Latin America, with a stock of U.S.$42 billion in 2014, only behind Brazil (U.S.$85 billion by 2012). In both Brazil and Mexico, Spain was the second source of FDI, behind only the United States (Álvaro, 2014; El País, 2013; La Razón, 2012; Robledo, 2014; Rousseff, 2012a).

Table 2. Spain-Latin America Foreign Direct Investments, 2007-2013.
Annual average L.A. FDI in Spain, 2007-2010	Annual average L.A. FDI in Spain, 2012-13	Share of Spanish FDI going to L.A. in 2007	Share of Spanish FDI going to Latin America, 2011-2013
€307 million	€1.4 billion	8.1%	23%
Source: Spanish Ministry of Trade

These statistics show that Latin America played a very important role during Spain’s crisis. Trade statistics indicate that Spaniards substituted Latin American goods and services for others and that Spanish firms turned to Latin American markets as an outlet for their exports in light of falling demand in the European Union. Investment statistics also show that Latin American MNEs saw the Spanish crisis as an opportunity to set foot in Spain at a time when Spanish assets were significantly cheaper than before the crisis. The statistics also suggest that Spanish firms made investments in Latin America to compensate for falling demand in Spain and in the European Union.
Tables 3-7 help highlight these patterns. Tables 4 and 5 show that trade between the E.U. and Latin America has continued to increase after the crisis, but not as significantly as trade between Spain and Latin America. Tables 6 and 7 show a similar pattern for F.D.I.


























The statistics reinforce the critical role of FDI instruction-rules within the Iberoamerican community during the financial crisis. Latin American MNEs became more proactive and pushed their home governments to negotiate friendly terms of access to Spain with the Spanish government on their behalf. In other words, Latin American MNEs and the governments of their host countries became leading norm entrepreneurs and pushed for instruction-rules that protected and encouraged FDI across Iberoamerica. 
The presidents of Brazil, Luiz Inácio da Silva (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–present), and of Mexico, Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), and Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–present), became leading norm entrepreneurs when they tried to protect the critical role accorded to FDI instruction-rules within the Iberoamerican normative community. In the midst of the financial crisis, they rose against challenges led by Venezuelan Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present), who promoted an alternative approach to pan-Latin American cooperation within the framework of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) and challenged the involvement of Spain within the Iberoamerican community (Corrales & Penfold, 2011). 
In 2006, Mexico and Spain renewed the agreement for protection and promotion of investments that had been signed in 1996 (an important commitment-rule that sought to create legal protection for FDI). Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto visited Spain in June 2014. At that time, Spain was Mexico’s seventh-largest trading partner and the largest in the European Union. His goal was to reach agreements on important commitment-rules to encourage and protect bilateral FDI. He signed several agreements with the Spanish government, including new credit lines in Mexico and Spain for small and medium-sized businesses wishing to make FDI in Mexico or Spain. Both heads of government highlighted the critical role of bilateral trade and investments at a press conference. Peña Nieto also led a delegation of Mexican business leaders who visited Spain’s main business association, Spanish  Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE), to reaffirm his administration’s commitment to the instruction-rules that accorded primordial importance to investment promotion within the Iberoamerican community. At the meeting, he highlighted the important growing trade and investment relations between Mexico and Spain and encouraged Spanish business leaders to invest in Mexico (Empresa Exterior, 2014; La Moncloa, 2014; Mexico Secretaría de Economía, 2014).
	Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, also played the role of norm entrepreneur and reaffirmed the importance of trade and investment within the Iberoamerican community. When King Juan Carlos I of Spain visited Brazil in June 2012, Rousseff gave a speech in which she made explicit reference to the promotion of “joint ventures” between Brazilian and Spanish firms because, she argued, “Brazil is preparing to take a competitive leap in its economy. That is why it is necessary to speed up development of our scientific and technological capacities.” She went on to highlight potential areas for investment, including infrastructure, transport, energy, telecommunications and especially, biomedicine, nanotechnology, defense, and information” (Rousseff, 2012a). President Rousseff visited Spain in November 2012 to attend that year’s Iberoamerican summit. She stayed on for a bilateral Brazil–Spain summit, during which Spain honored her with one of the country’s highest honors, the Order of Isabella the Catholic. President Rousseff, who visited Spain with the Ministers of Education and Science and Technology, reiterated the common values shared by Brazil and Spain and emphasized Brazil’s commitment to bilateral cooperation in “science, technology and innovation, in areas that include water-resource management, industrial cooperation in the field of defense, naval industry, road, railroad, ports and airport construction, nanotechnology and oil and gas” and invited Spanish firms to invest in these industries in Brazil (Rousseff, 2012b; Rousseff in La Moncloa, 2012).
The Spanish government also countered challenges to the liberal instruction-rules, calling for free trade and investment within the Iberoamerican normative community by engaging the friendlier governments, such as those of Brazil and Mexico. Courting Brazilian investment was a priority since the advent of the financial crisis. In June 2012, king Juan Carlos I of Spain led a visit by a group of prominent Spanish business leaders to Brazil, where they met with Brazilian political and business leaders. Spanish diplomats at the time referred to this visit as “the most important meeting for Spanish business people” (El Mundo, 2012). The Spanish government wanted to facilitate contacts between Spanish and Brazilian business leaders and participation of Spanish firms in major infrastructure projects in Brazil, such as the high-speed train between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and infrastructure works for the 2016 Olympic Games. In his speech, king Juan Carlos I highlighted Spain’s “important structural reforms” and “sound macroeconomic indicators.” He went on to stress the importance of the delegation of business people who accompanied him to Brazil, stating that they represented “world-leading firms in their industries: banking, distribution, energy, infrastructure, engineering, telecommunications and hydrocarbons, among others” (Juan Carlos I of Spain, 2012a, pp. 27–28).
The king also invited Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, to attend the Iberoamerican summit that Spain was planning to host in November of that year. President Rousseff accepted the invitation and, during her visit to Spain, King Juan Carlos I reiterated to her the commitment of Spanish MNEs to stay in Brazil in the long run and their willingness to “help Brazil meet the challenges” of organizing the Soccer World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 (Juan Carlos I of Spain, 2012b, pp. 69–70). He also encouraged Brazilian firms to consider investing in Spain, 





The fact that the governments and prominent businesss leaders of Latin America and Spain embraced Western liberal values during the third wave of democratization has facilitated relations between them, especially since the end of the Cold War. Latin America and Spain share liberal instruction-rules that have facilitated the construction of a normative Iberoamerican community. Some of the most important instruction-rules were the promotion of democracy and human rights, cooperation for development, security, and multilateralism. Promotion and protection of these values helped Latin American governments gain international legitimacy and support and increased their ability to attract foreign aid. Since the late 1980s, the governments and leading businesses have regarded trade and FDI as important components of development and economic cooperation and have spelled out instruction-rules (promotion of FDI), directive-rules (credit, competition legislation, most-favored status) and commitment-rules (bilateral agreements for protection against political risk) to regulate and facilitate trade and FDI within the Iberoamerican community. Spanish FDI in Latin America began to grow in the late 1980s, as leading Spanish firms took over formerly state-owned enterprises that were privatized across Latin America. Spanish FDI peaked by the turn of the 21st century. The advent of the financial crisis in 2008 affected the Spanish economy severely, and incoming and outgoing Spanish FDI declined considerably. At that point, the governments of Brazil, Mexico, and Spain, as well as leading MNEs from the three countries, played the role of norm entrepreneurs and reaffirmed the important role of FDI as a strategy to overcome the crisis. The governments of Mexico and Brazil, along with leading MNEs from both countries, saw the Spanish financial crisis as an opportunity to make FDI in Spain. By investing in the midst of the crisis, they could take over Spanish assets at a discount. Spain could serve as a base to grow their operations in the European Union. The Spanish government and leading Spanish businesses saw FDI from Latin America as an opportunity to infuse liquidity into ailing Spanish industries and firms. Meanwhile, the Brazilian government and Brazilian businesses regarded the promotion of FDI by Spanish MNEs as an opportunity to access technology and knowhow. Spanish businesses saw FDI in Latin America as an opportunity to expand in growing markets where business prospects were more positive than in the Europen Union.
Scholars grounded in a positivist tradition contend that a normative framework does not uncover causal relationships. They argue instead that constructivism highlights the context in which causality happens. Indeed, the causal justification for investment decisions rests within the decision-making process of the specific firms whose managers decide to invest abroad, but investment is a social practice that does not occur in a vacuum. To justify their investment decisions, managers take into consideration their firms’ strengths and weaknesses and the potential to translate those into opportunities in host markets. They are more likely to find opportunities in countries that belong to the same normative community, because their firms can participate as norm entrepreneurs in the design of the rules. 
The application of a rule-oriented constructivist approach to the study of FDI flows between Latin America and Spain uncovers this broader normative background that helps explain the significant growth of FDI (and trade) between Spain and Latin America in the 1990s and again in the context of the financial crisis that severely affected Spain between 2008 and 2014, at a time when trade and investment fell considerably across the developed world, including Spain. The construction of an Iberoamerican normative community informed by liberal economic values reaffirmed the importance of trade and investment for economic growth and development. The prime ministers of Spain in the 1980s and 1990s served as norm entrepreneurs. Their Latin American counterparts at the time validated their claims, paving the way for a wave of FDI by Spanish firms in Latin America in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
During the financial crisis (2008–2014), the presidents of Brazil and Mexico, the government of Spain—represented by King Juan Carlos I and the prime ministers—and leading MNEs from both sides of the Atlantic rebuffed efforts by Venezuela to challenge these rules and reaffirmed their commitment to free trade and investment in the Iberoamerican normative community. Their role as norm entrepreneurs facilitated a significant increase in trade and investment between Spain and Latin America during the crisis.
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